By studying the process of reform of the Schengen acquis in 2011-2013 inspired by the Arab Spring and the inflow of migrants to the Mediterranean shores of the European Union, in this paper I seek to show how policy entrepreneurs exploit windows of opportunity that open following an external shock (a notion I use to conceptualise the events of the Arab Spring) in order to fulfill their own preferences, regardless of the substance of the external shock in question. How could it happen that the reform initiated by Italy and France in 2011 to "re-nationalise the Schengen" would in the end turn just the opposite of what they sought to achieve? My research suggests that the major factor which helps explain this is the institutional standing of the European Commission which holds exclusive right of legislative initiative, and the fact that by using its position, the Commission was able to win over the European Parliament to its side by effectively making it into a veto-player in its negotiations with the EU Council, thus trapping the Member States into the "joint decision trap". JEL Classification: F55.
INTRODUCTION
With the European Coal and Steal Community, the European Economic Community and the Euratom, all created in the 1950s, came theories devised to explain the phenomenon of regional integration in Europe.
The reason neofunctionalism and the intergovernmental approach are commonly referred to as "grand theories" is precisely that their task was to explain the process of integration as a whole, taking it for a major dependent variable. Yet by the late 1980s the research agenda has noticeably shifted from "the ultimate question of life, the Universe and everything" and towards the narrower question of how the Communities (EC) function. During this period the students of European integration started to pay more attention to specific manifestations of the integration process: the new policies created within the EC institutional framework, their implementation in the Member States, reforms of the supranational policies, etc. (these developments in the discipline are outlined in Dekalchuk and Khokhlova 2015) .
In this paper I contribute to this research agenda by studying the process of reform of the Schengen acquis in 2011-2013 inspired by the Arab Spring and the inflow of migrants to the Mediterranean shores of the European Union (EU), with a special attention to the role played by the European Commission in this process. The paper seeks to show how policy entrepreneurs exploit windows of opportunity that open following an external shock (a notion I use to conceptualise the events of the Arab Spring) in order to fulfill their own preferences, regardless of the substance of the external shock in question.
The 2011-2013 Schengen reform is interesting here for two reasons. First, the Arab Spring and the migration pressures it created form a classical example of an external shock, that is a shock external to the policy both geographically and content-wise (Dekalchuk 2014) . Indeed, neither geographically, nor substantially the Arab Spring event can be easily related to the functioning of the Schengen area as such.
If the inflow of migrants were to expose weak spots in an EU policy and cause its reform, then it should have been the migration policy and possibly the common asylum policy, but certainly not the policy pertaining to free movement of persons within the Schengen area.
Secondly, a number of diverse actors active in European politics tried to take benefit of the window of opportunity that opened with the Arab Spring, and to push through with the reform that corresponded to their preferences. In this respect both the Italian and French governments, and the European Commission acted as political entrepreneurs anticipant of an appropriate external shock "like surfers waiting for the big wave" and "ready to paddle" (Kingdon 2003, 165) . Curiously, the French and Italian authorities were very active in promoting their preferences to "re-nationalise the Schengen" and consolidate the national component in the Schengen governance at the outset of the reformб and their interests diverged dramatically with those of the European Commission which saw the opportunity to deepen the integration in free movement of persons within the Schengen area. It is curious exactly because despite all the attempts France and Italy made to get their own way, the outcome of the reform ultimately reflected the preferences of the Commission, rather than those actors who initiated the reform in the first place.
How could it happen that the reform initiated by Italy and France in 2011 would in the end turn just the opposite of what they sought to achieve? My research suggests that the major factor which helps explain this is the institutional standing of the European Commission which holds exclusive right of legislative initiative, and the fact that by using its position, the Commission was able to win over the European Parliament to its side by effectively making it into a veto-player in its negotiations with the EU Council.
A significant body of research is devoted to the impact of the Arab Spring on the European Union. Yet most of it does not seek to explain the outcomes of specific reforms launched in response to the revolutionary events in Maghreb, and the studies that deal with the impact of the Arab Spring on the EUlevel policies mostly focus on the issues of migration and asylum.
At the same time the research on the Schengen reform is plenty (Carrera 2010; Carrera 2011; Hobbing 2011; Carrera 2012; Carrera, Den Hertog, and Parkin 2012; Carrera, Hernanz, and Parkin 2013a; Carrera, Hernanz, and Parkin 2013b; Pascouau 2011a; Pascouau 2011b; Pascouau 2011c; Pascouau and McLoughlin 2011; Pascouau 2012; Pascouau 2013; Monar 2011; Monar 2012; Monar 2013; Monar 2014) .
Common for these studies is that while providing thorough description of the processes that preceded the reform, as well as the impact of the Arab Spring and the roles played by all major actors on the European political arena and their input in the reform, they do not attempt to theoretically explain these processes. A number of recent studies (Zaiotti 2013; Bocquillon and Dobbels 2014) makes up for this obvious shortcoming to some extent by analysing and theoretically substantiating certain aspects of the process of adopting the Schengen Governance Package in 2011-2013. Unlike the literature mentioned above the present paper traces the influence of the Arab Spring on the behaviour of the major actors not only on the stage of initiating the reform, but during the negotiations and when adopting the Package. Thus the paper presents a comprehensive and detailed account of the Schengen reform in 2011-2013. Theoretical substantiation of these events follows in the conclusion.
Besides the primary sources and secondary coverage provided in the media, I also rely on three in-depth interviews with the first-hand participants in the Schengen reform (conducted in Brussels in July 2012).
All of the interviewees preferred not to be named which is why only their job titles at the time of the interviews are mentioned.
EXPOSITION: THE ARAB SPRING AND THE INFLOW OF MIGRANTS TO LAMPEDUSA
The 2010-2011 revolutionary uprisings in the Maghreb countries were from the very outset accompanied with a massive outflow of the African population. Already by February 2011 the numbers of migrants from Tunisia and the neighbouring countries was big enough to cause a serious concern with the Italian Yet by the end of the month the situation deteriorated. On February 24-25 Maroni attended the EU Council only to demand once again that the EU shows more solidarity with Italy and that the migrant pressure is redistributed among Member States more evenly, but received no support from the other ministers (except for his Greek, Cypriot, Maltese and Spanish colleagues). Austria, Germany and some other Member States believed that the Italian authorities overstated the problem (Spiegel Online 2011; Dohment et al. 2011; Monar 2012, 117, 122 was not enough, and that it was necessary to also "clean the sink", that is, get rid of the migrants already present in Italy («Maroni firma l'accordo con la Tunisia» 2011).
ENTANGLEMENT: THE FRANCO-ITALIAN PROPOSAL TO "RE-NATIONALISE THE

SCHENGEN"
Of course, these actions and statements by the Italian authorities raised hackles among Italy's European . It might seem that adopting such a cautious reform should not have caused any difficulties. Yet the Parliament joined the game as the Council had to consult it in order to approve the Commission proposals. In his negative conclusion the EP LIBE Committee rapporteur Carlos Coelho demanded that the Commission withdraw its proposals and comes back with the new ones. The reason for that was the fact that the proposals' legal base did not take full account of the role of the Parliament which could only state its opinion in the consultation procedure that could then be completely ignored by the Council. The rapporteur found that the Commission had to propose co-decision as the legal procedure so that the EP would become a co-legislator along the Council. Partly this reasoning was due to the fact that the Lisbon Treaty which would shortly enter into force gave the Parliament much more authority in this area ( Decision by the Commission to propose draft legislation in these areas caused some agitation in the European institutions, but of course most excited were the members of the European Parliament. When talking to the MEPs on May 10 Barroso was forced to make excuses and explain that the reform was neither a spontaneous reaction, nor a concession to Rome and Paris:
It took Commission a little less than one year to review its proposals, and on November 16, 2010 it initiated the reform of the Schengen evaluation mechanism once again. Now the legislative procedure suggested by the Commission was the ordinary legislative procedure (previously known as co-decision). The Parliament would thus become a co-legislator on this Regulation. Substantially though the new proposal did not differ much from the old one (European Commission 2010). It is this proposal that Berlusconi and Sarkozy refer to when they write about the necessity to keep the leading role in the evaluation process for the Member States in their letter.
"Already last year, the Commission put forward proposals to preserve and strengthen the evaluation mechanism of Schengen… And I want to underline: already last year, well before the recent developments, the Commission has identified some problems in the governance of Schengen. We will now update and complete these proposals... While recent events have provided a spark of urgency to bring this to the table, the Commission takes this opportunity…, to address the long-standing, underlying inconsistencies and unresolved issues that have provided scope for some Member States to act unilaterally... This is not a kneejerk reaction. This is not an improvisation."
Our interviewee who participated in preparing the Communication issued by the Commission in May confirms that it was not provoked by the discord between Paris and Rome. In fact, "the content of that Thus on the initial stage of reform the European Commission managed to take the lead and used its Communication to shape the discussion during the June Summit. Essentially, through its May and June actions the European bureaucracy prompted the European Council to instruct it to conduct the type of reform it wanted and planned to conduct. As one of the staffers of the Council secretariat mentioned, "in fact a successful Commission is a Commission which uses cleverly the European Council to push its own ideas" (Bocquillon and Dobbels 2014, 27 ).
On July 7 the European Parliament also made clear its position concerning the Schengen reform. While in general supporting the Commission proposal, the MEPs warned it against any attempts to include in the proposal any provisions that would expand the grounds for temporary reinstatement of the border controls.
To the contrary, they insisted on a narrower and stricter definition of the criteria already listed in the Schengen Border Code 6 . Finally, the MEPs also made it unambiguously clear that the legal base for the Commission proposals could only be article 77 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which provides for the ordinary legal procedure 7 (European Parliament 2011b).
Thus the Parliament not only demonstrated its pro-integrationist stance, but also made clear to the Commission that it was willing to play by its side and counter the attempts of some of the Member States to "re-nationalise" the Schengen legislation and jeopardise "the very spirit of the Schengen rules"
(European Parliament 2011b).
CULMINATION: COMMISSION'S DEXTERITY AND THE INTER-INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT
The proposal presented by the Commission on September 16, 2011 could not fail to seem extremely ambitious to all of the participants to the process, especially given the circumstances that served as a pretext for the supranational bureaucracy to launch the reform. In the proposal, "re-nationalising the Schengen" was completely out of question. To the contrary, the Commission tried to enlarge its authority to the widest extent possible. As one of the Commission officials mentioned, "the conclusions [of the
European Council] also left room for interpretation…, and we interpreted that they [the rules for reintroducing border checks] had to be simplified by introducing more Europe" (Bocquillon and Dobbels 2014, 33) .
When initiating the proposals, the Commission acted very rationally and tried to engage the European Parliament on its side. Indeed, the changes it introduced to its earlier 2010 proposal for the Schengen evaluation mechanism were practically identical to those suggested by the EP rapporteur Carlos Coelho in April 2011. Take the idea of a safeguard clause whereby the Commission could issue an implementing act 6 The Code was adopted in 2006 by the Council and the European Parliament. It regulates the rules governing the temporary reinstatement of the border controls by the Schengen members. The grounds for reintroduction of the border controls are public security concerns in cases of large-scale events or the necessity to urgently reinforce the internal security as a reply to emergencies (e.g. terrorist attacks). The decision to reintroduce border controls should be taken by the Member State, but it has to give advance notice to the other Member States and the Commission (if it is the matter of a preplanned event, such as a football championship) or to report it after the event (if the reinstatement was extraordinary) ( The only provision that could be remotely considered a concession to the Member States was a reference made in the preamble which stated that "the crossing of the external border of a large number of thirdcountry nationals might, in exceptional circumstances, justify the immediate reintroduction of some internal border controls, if such a measure is needed to safeguard public policy and internal security at the Union or national level from a serious and urgent threat". A Member State could take such a decision unilaterally, but for a period no longer than five days -the prolongation of this period was up to the Commission (see paragraph 5 of the preamble and article 25 in European Commission 2011c, 6, 10-11). 
It was then quite natural that the Commission proposals caused a storm of criticism from the Member
States who were not ready to give up the decision on such a sensitive matter of national security and cede it to the Commission (Monar 2012, 124) . Already by December 2011 it was obvious that the Council was not only going to reject the idea of transferring the competence of reinstating border controls to the European Commission, but would also try to change the legal base for one of the two proposals which related to the evaluation mechanism in order to exclude the European Parliament from the decisionmaking process in this area.
In The reaction of the EP was quick to follow and was something absolutely novel for the relations between the two legislative institutions (Carrera, Hernanz, and Parkin 2013b, 14) . Although substantively the positions of the EP and the Council on most issues within the package were very close (Koper 2013, 40-43; Peers 2013, 35-41) , on June 14 the Parliament suspended the adoption of both regulations by withdrawing them from the agenda of the July plenary session. Moreover, it also "froze" another five proposals on justice and home affairs that were under consideration at the time. Martin Schulz, the President of the Parliament, expressed the joint position of most political groups by saying that "it is without precedent that in the middle of the legislative process, one co-legislative chamber excludes the other" and that this decision of the Council taken on June 7 was a "a slap in the face of parliamentary democracy and is unacceptable to the directly elected representatives of European citizens". The MEPs also expressed their willingness to join the Commission and bring a suit to the ECJ against the Council Thus for the rest of 2012 the negotiations stalled. Mostly this was due to the fact that the Cypriot presidency, as well as the Danish presidency already discredited in the eyes of the MEPs, could hardly broker the deal between the two institutions. As Dinan mentions, "the fact that Cyprus was not in the Schengen area and faced considerable criticism for its handling of migrants did not increase the country's relatively limited diplomatic leverage" (Dinan 2013, 100) .
DENOUEMENT: PARLIAMENT AS A VETO-PLAYER AND THE OUTCOME OF THE
REFORM
By April 2013 the conflict between the Council and the Parliament remained unresolved. First of all, Carlos Coelho, the rapporteur on the Regulation on evaluation mechanism, insisted on introducing the so called bridging clause into the regulation -a special provision which would effectively link this regulation to the one on Schengen Border Code. Thus if the Council would want to amend the Schengen evaluation mechanism, it would also be obliged to reform the Border Code, which would allow the EP to participate in the procedure and influence indirectly the Council position on the evaluation mechanism. There also were some other issues that still disturbed the MEPs:
 the nonbinding character of the document that the Council (and not the Commission as the EP and the supranational bureaucracy aspired for) could adopt if in the process of evaluation of the implementation of the Schengen acquis by the Commission it would find persistent problems that could jeopardise the functioning of the Schengen area;
 the insufficiency of information provided to the Parliament regarding the contents of the country evaluation reports;
 and the procedure for conducting unscheduled inspections of individual Member States by the Commission (Carrera, Hernanz, and Parkin 2013a, 10).
The compromise was found when on May 30, 2013 the Irish presidency made public the new draft version of the Council Regulation on Schengen evaluation mechanism which did not only formally recognise that the Council would amend the Regulation only after consulting the EP, but also, and more importantly, agreed to provide all the country reports to the EP, even if they contained classified information (see paragraph 15 (a) in the preamble and articles 13 and 16 in Presidency 2013, 6, 19, 21) . In less than two This is why the move to securitize (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998) No wonder that this rhetoric had no effect on the European Commission or the other Member States which time after time denied activation of the solidarity mechanism to Italy and failed to perceive the relatively restrained migratory pressure that Italy experienced as an emergency.
The situation changed when Italy moved from words to deeds and started handing out temporary residence permits to the migrants from Tunisia and the neighbouring countries whose only goal was to move to France, Germany, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. Now it was the French President's Nicolas Sarkozy to use the securitizing rhetoric, although again the target of his securitizing move were not France's European partners, but French population -and again because of the approaching elections.
The actions that followed: detaining migrants in the border regions, their removal back to Italy and the effective introduction of the border control on the French-Italian border, were justified by the French authorities through the threat to public order and national security that migrants allegedly posed.
The discourse used by the two countries' authorities led them to assert the need to reform the Schengen legislation in order to reinforce the national control over the system of temporary reinstatement of the internal borders, in particular as a response to growing migratory pressures on external borders of the Schengen area. Yet as our interviewee mentions, after a while not only Italy and France but everybody realized that this uncontrolled influx of asylum seekers, refugees, has nothing to do with Schengen and you're not going to solve this with Schengen. Schengen is something totally different -it's about movement of free persons within the Schengen zone. The problem with immigration with asylum, refugees, is an asylum, refugee problem! (Interview with the high-level official from DG D «Justice and Home Affairs» of the General Council of the EU Council (at the time of the interview) 2012).
Thus the French and Italian governments obviously proved the first-mover entrepreneurs who responded to the electoral incentives that the national authorities faced by explicitly connecting the external shock to the Schengen policy and using this connection to articulate the need for a reform. Sarkozy's and Berlusconi's preferences regarding the reform were absolutely specific: reinforcing the national control over the Schengen system and the effective "re-nationalization" of the right to temporarily restore the border controls on the internal borders when the Member State deems such reinstatement necessary.
Yet due to the Commission's exclusive right to initiate EU legislation it was only the Commission that could launch the Schengen reform in reaction to the demands of Paris and Rome. As one EU official who for a long time was in charge of migration, asylum and borders in the Commission, in fact there was a number of strategies that the Commission could embrace after Sarkozy and Berlusconi sent their letter to Barroso. And in his opinion it would have been a sound decision not to initiate the reform:
I think that what the Commission should have done in this case should have been to apply the Metock case working method. Metock was a court case concerning, to put it in very simple terms, the consequences of free circulation of persons of marriage of EC and non-EC citizens. Metock caused some emotion in some of our Member States, which immediately wanted to question some of the provisions of the consolidated free circulation directive. The Commission at that time very skillfully resisted this by making clear that it was not willing to embark onto a modification of this directive unless there was a very good case for it and by therefore, committing itself to engage into an in-depth examination together with Member States of possible problems, issues, and ways to solve and to sort out… This led, in a very swift way, to the conclusion that no revision of the directive was needed, that no, the problems were not of such a magnitude that the free circulation of person could have been seen as opening the door for irregular migrants entering or moving within the EU through fake marriages… It went down that way and now today everybody has forgotten about the consequences of the case… (Interview with the high-level official from the Commission (at the time of the interview) 2012).
In other words, the Commission through its steering of the legislative agenda could try to bring to naught the discussion of the Schengen reform by choosing the option that Bachrach and Baratz call nondecisionmaking (Bachrach and Baratz 1963) . Yet the Commission understood that the question of reforming the Schengen rules would anyway make it to the focus of the discussion during the June European Council, and so it decided to gain the first mover advantage by attempting to set the framework of this discussion thus effectively forcing the EU leadership to instruct it to initiate the kind of reform that would correspond to the Commission's own preferences.
The Commission proposal was made public in September 2011. It proved extremely ambitious and caused some bewilderment and indignation among the Member States who found the proposals to encroach upon the matters of security and sovereignty. Nevertheless, according to the interviewee from the Council's Secretariat, the Commission acted very rationally:
"The first thing I want to say is… [that] power is always taken and never offered. This explained maybe already part of it [of the content of the Commission's proposals]. Secondly, it is of course also clear that if the Commission comes with this kind of proposal, then it knows that there is going to be tough negotiation. My second proverb is, if you fire an arrow, aim it high because it will come down as it flies… I think everybody, on the side of the Commission, was taking into account that within the negotiation procedure the church would move to the middle of the village again, you see? And that we would come with some more equilibrated, but the first was of course, give it all to the Communities. (Interview with the high-level official from DG D «Justice and Home Affairs» of the General Council of the EU Council (at the time of the interview) 2012).
Against this background both France and Italy, as well as the rest of the Member States who prescribed the Commission to come up with a reform proposal by September, were caught in the "joint-decision trap": now they could not influence the exact contents of the proposals. The Commission was also rational in the way it engaged the European Parliament which allowed it to make a stand for the pro-integrationist reform not only during the initiation of the reform, but also on a later stage of negotiations.
The Commission knew from its own experience of the 2009 negotiations that the Parliament had a clear preference to co-legislate on the Schengen evaluation mechanism, and that the Member States were reluctant to let the supranational institutions into this sensitive area. It seems that the strategy and calculus of the Commission allowed it to use the European institutional framework to its benefit and not only prevent a regress of the integration within the Schengen policy, but also to force the Member States to accept the outcome they would not initially approve.
By prescribing the ordinary legislative procedure as the decision-making procedure for both regulations, the Commission effectively transformed the European Parliament into a veto-player. The Council (which has no formal means of influencing the EU legislative agenda) tried to follow the Rikerian logic 9 and changed the voting procedure for one of the two regulations in order to exclude the Parliament from voting on the evaluation mechanism, which should have changed the outcome of the negotiations. But this still would not allow the Member States to disregard the MEPs given that the reform could only succeed if both regulations would be adopted at the same time, and that it was impossible to adopt the second regulation without the Parliament.
